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ERECTING THE PUBLIC INFORMATION 
MARKETPLACE1 
Alon Peled, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, 
Alon.Peled@post.harvard.edu 
Abstract 
 
How can we incentivize public agencies to share electronic information effectively? I first 
argue that the Obama Administration's Web 2.0 methodology of addressing this  question 
(http://www.data.gov) will fail because (1) Federal agencies will not willingly surrender 
precious information assets that are the source of their political power; (2) valuable data has 
a currency value in the information age—it is not free; and (3) a Web 2.0 approach to sharing 
public sector data ignores (and sometimes exacerbates) important problems including how to 
delete data about citizens, how to create historical versions of the digital image of the citizen, 
and how to uncover the hidden and powerful algorithms that govern the production of public 
sector data.  
 
 
Instead of Obama's Open Data approach, I propose to redefine the public sector as that 
which holds the legitimate monopoly on primordial data (such as social security IDs). Based 
on this, I have developed a new information sharing architecture based on three key ideas: 
(1) bureaucratic politics must take primacy over technology; (2) bureaucratic language can 
be automated to facilitate information-sharing transactions; and (3) information-sharing 
transactions can be monetized as buy and sell transactions.  
 
 
This paper also presents the theoretical foundations for a computational linguistics project to 
erect a Public Information Marketplace, and discusses several political, legal, economic, 
ethical, regulatory and technical challenges for building such a marketplace. The paper 
concludes with a concrete political strategy on how to advance the proposed new information 
marketplace. 
 
Keywords: Information Sharing, Open Data, Electronic Trading, Public Administration 
 
 
                                                
1 Portions of this paper are currently under adjudication for publication in the Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory (JPART) and Public Administration Review. A small section of 
this paper was published in Peled, Alon. "The Electronic Mountain: A Tale of Two Tels". American 
Review of Public Administration, Vol. 37, No. 4 (December 2007): 458-478 
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1 THE PUBLIC SECTOR'S ELECTRONIC INFORMATION 
SHARING PROBLEM 
The private sector is accumulating huge volumes of digital data. For example, Google 
alone holds over 200 times the amount of data stored in the Library of Congress. 
Several American Federal entities such as the National Security Agency (NSA) and 
the Department of Energy (DOE) store even larger volumes of digital data than 
Google.2 The digitization of data in numerous domains further intensifies this data-
accumulation trend. Thus, for example, in 2000, a survey estimated that the 
Department of Defense's (DoD) biological bank held 176.5M files and 282M 
biological samples and that this biological storage house was growing annually by 
20M files—this before the intensification of national security efforts after September 
11 2001 (Anderlik and Rothstein 2001 415). 
 
Today, the public sector only "sees" the virtual image of the citizen rather than 
interacting with the physical citizen herself. Agencies fiercely battle each other to 
acquire a legal monopoly over new information assets. An increasing number of 
Federal agencies posses a sophisticated high-end computing gear and technical 
knowledge, and process huge amounts of digital data so they can replace human 
intuition with statistics and business intelligence (Ayers 2007 10, 31, 33, 43-45, 69). 
Sometimes, the value of information assets is discovered when these assets are stolen. 
For example, in 2008, the German government purchased for $6.2M a stolen CD with 
information about the foreign bank accounts of rich Germans. Many rich Germans 
then voluntarily confessed about their foreign bank accounts. Over the next two years, 
the German government collected an additional 180M euro in tax revenues thanks to 
this stolen CD (i.e., thus, the $6.2M investment yielded a 4500% growth) (Jolly 2010 
; Landler 2008). 
 
In my previous work, I redefined the public sector as the collection of institutions 
whose administrative staff successfully upholds a claim on the monopoly of the 
legitimate process of producing, updating and disseminating primordial data. 
Primordial data are primary data elements (ex: social security identifier) about the 
entire population that serve to link and update all other data sets.3 For example, in the 
USA, one is not legally dead until his or her name lands inside the infamous Social 
Security Administration (SSA) “Master Death File”, which, in turn, updates numerous 
other databases (GAO 1994, 2007). I explained that each generation redefines the 
essence of the public administration based on its needs. For example, Woodrow 
Wilson, in 1887, sought to protect the public sector from corrupt politicians and 
therefore defined public administration as laying outside the proper sphere of politics 
(Wilson 1887). Likewise, after the tumultuous 1960s, social equity became an 
important mission for government, and scholars followed suit by inserting this new 
mission into the definition of the public sector (Frederickson 1971). More recent 
definitions have been influenced by globalization and theories of social capital 
(Bozeman 1987 ; Pierre 1995).  
 
                                                
2  NSA tracks, records and analyzes close to 70% of all electronic communications on earth via Project 
ECHELON (formed in 1971) and DoE has been collecting and analyzing data on simulations of 
nuclear weapons tests since 1972. 
3 Peled, Alon "Traversing Digital Babel" Public Administration Review (forthcoming 2011). 
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Our generation, I argued, must redefine the public sector as an information-processing 
machine due to three reasons.  First, the public sector’s data elements are ubiquitous, 
ranging from the obvious (ex: a driver’s license ID) to the obscure (ex: Kentucky’s 
Bonus Wildlife Management Area Quota Hunt Deer Permit ID). Ownership of a 
particular data element is assigned or revoked by law. For example, a congressional 
act assigned ownership of Energy Guide labels to the DOE and removed this 
responsibility from state-level bureaucracies. Agencies gain significant new resources 
when they become the owners of a new data element. For example, the Department of 
Agriculture (DOA) won such new resources to develop standards for organically 
produced food products. Second, the public sector accumulates an ever-growing 
stockpile of digital data elements that it must maintain and disseminate. Finally, an 
information food chain governs our modern economy. This chain is founded on the 
public sector’s primordial data-elements. In short, the public sector is the “great 
infocrator,” a term which combines the ideas of “information,” “creator” [of data 
elements] and “dictator” [ruling over primordial data elements]. There is no escape 
from this infocrator. Every life change and event is captured in a data element owned 
by a public agency. Moreover, by law citizens must provide timely information to 
update these data elements. Resultantly, the public sector then becomes the owner of 
the most valuable information assets.4 
 
Yet, public organizations fail—time and again—to share their precious information 
assets with other public agencies. For example, Federal agencies’ inability to share 
counterterrorism information was the US government’s greatest failure before 9/11. 
The President and Congress have since enacted eleven presidential directives and 
congressional acts instructing the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
other agencies to share security information (GAO 2006). The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) has designated homeland security information-sharing 
as a high-risk area (GAO 2005, 2007). These efforts, however, have not yielded 
adequate results, as recently evidenced by the USA intelligence community's failure 
to fuse into a coherent story all the discrete pieces of information regarding the 
Christmas 2009 airline attack. Addressing this crucial issue, a White House review 
concluded that counterterrorism IT did not sufficiently enable the correlation of data 
that would have helped avert this attack (Elliott and Baldor 2009 ; White House 
2010). It is clear that information sharing has not significantly improved since 9/11, 
and that federal agencies are still failing to "connect the dots". Therefore, how can we 
incentivize public institutions to share information more effectively? 
 
2 A CRITIQUE OF OBAMA'S OPEN DATA APPROACH TO 
INCREASE ELECTRONIC INFORMATION 
The Obama Administration has adopted an "Open Data" approach to address this 
aforementioned question. On his first day as President, Obama signed the Open 
Government Directive instructing all Federal agencies to post on the web as much 
data as possible. Specifically, this directive instructed each Federal agency to publish 
on the web three high-value data sets. In March 2009, Obama appointed Vivek 
Kundra as the first Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) and Kundra, in turn, 
                                                
4 Wherever and whenever used, the terms "citizens" in this paper refers to all people living in the state 
(citizens and residents alike) about which the Federal government collects and stores data. 
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launched www.data.gov. The key idea behind this initiative was to foster a web 
2.0/social networking environment in which Federal agencies release valuable data. 
The public, in turn, Kundra argued, will then build applications to analyze and display 
the released Federal data. Released data and open source applications are then meshed 
up to increase governmental transparency and accountability and to improve public 
services (Economist 2010 10-11; Hoover 2009 ; Noveck 2009). 
 
I argue that this approach is the wrong panacea for Federal information sharing 
problems due to three reasons. First, information assets are the most important sources 
of political power for Federal agencies; hence these agencies are unlikely to release 
these assets. Instead, I believe that agencies will "comply" with Obama's Presidential 
Directive by inundating data.gov with large volumes of unimportant data while 
carefully and jealously guarding more valuable data.  Second, in the information age, 
the value of data is not $0. In the commercial marketplace, the most successful 
vendors, such as Apple, eBay and Amazon, are the ones who managed to create 
marketplaces where bits and bytes of data (including digital versions of songs, 
applications and movies) are exchanged for a price—even if a very low price 
measured sometimes in fraction of cents. I believe that, if the Obama Administration 
will continue to press hard to promote its www.data.gov initiative, a dangerous 
downwards spiral will evolve. Agencies will increasingly release large quantities of 
useless data. Software developers will discover that the released data is useless and 
will develop less open source applications to manipulate this data. Governmental 
agencies will then be "disappointed" to discover that so little is done with their 
released data and will release even less important data. Ultimately, both the 
government and the public will lose interest in www.data.gov. Thirdly, www.data.gov 
does not address, and, in some cases, exacerbates, the key problems that government 
must tackle in the information age. These problems include questions such as: How, 
when and why does the government delete data about citizens? How can a citizen 
know what his or her "digital image" looked like at a given point in time (say, for 
example, two years ago) when the government made an important decision about him 
or her (for example, to deny the citizen a Federal job)? How can citizens correct 
inaccurate personal data across multiple Federal computers? How can Federal 
decision makers know which data assets are more important than others? How can the 
Federal government uncover, inspect, and correct some of the hidden algorithms that 
command the process of manufacturing and using data about citizens? How can we 
detect if certain sources of data were not created, released, and manipulated with the 
explicit intention of hurting certain groups, interests or individuals? Unpleased with 
Obama's Web 2.0 approach to increasing electronic information sharing, in the next 
section I will develop an alternative approach to expand Federal electronic 
information sharing via a new public information marketplace. 
 
3 ERECTING THE PUBLIC INFORMATION 
MARKETPLACE 
I propose that public data be thought of as a "contested commodity."5 A contested 
commodity is a product or service where the process of its commoditization is likely 
to yield benefits such as the expansion of trade, the settlement of flexible and 
                                                
5 Radin (1996) defines and explains the concept of a "contested commodity." 
Peled. Alon "Erecting the Public Information Marketplace," MCIS, September 12-14 2010 
 5 
competitive prices and the uprooting of black marketeering behavior. Nonetheless, 
this product is "contested" because people are left with an uneasy, gnawing feeling 
that it is not ethnical to place such a product within the context of a marketplace. 
Typically contested commodities involve, in one aspect or another, the process of 
"commodifiction of life" itself (Parry 2004, 265). Examples of "contested 
commodities" include trading in bodily organs (live and cadaver organs), prostitution, 
surrogate motherhood services, babies, the bodily relics of saints in medieval ages, 
detailed marriage contracts and genetics information. I argue that digital data about 
the so called "virtual citizen" is another type of a contested commodity. 
 
I further propose that government can carefully create an internal public information 
marketplace within which public agencies will buy and sell this contested commodity. 
Selfish agencies which place their narrow bureaucratic interests above everything else 
will be drawn to trade data in this new marketplace. Over time, this marketplace will 
create powerful incentives for public agencies to discover and unlock internal 
information assets. A creative political and regulatory framework along with a new 
controlled computer natural language can be created to launch this public information 
marketplace. I contend that a complete political, ethical, economic, legal, regulatory 
and technical infrastructure can be erected to unleash a new "information ecology" 
within the Federal government. The erection of this new public information trading 
marketplace will save billions of dollars as doomed-to-fail Federal database-
integration projects will no longer be needed. In this proposed marketplace, just-in-
time data assets will become available to agencies. These assets will then empower a 
more nimble and smarter government whose actions and decisions are more 
transparent to the public. 
 
The digital data that the government collects about us, the citizens, falls under one of 
the following three categories. Data that is both predictive in nature and was extracted 
unintentionally (ex: genetic data discovered via a routine blood test) belongs to the 
"non-tradable data" category. Conversely, data such as the license number of a car or 
a gun belongs to the "tradable data" category. In between these two categories, huge 
quantities of public data belong to the third category which I term the "contested data" 
category.  On the one hand, subjecting these pieces of data to the powers of a 
marketplace will yield enormous benefits. These benefits include the ability to 
create—for the first time in the history of the Federal government--a real and concrete 
price tag for data, and the constant and instant movement of data within government 
as the exclusive and objective measurement for the value of public information assets. 
In addition, Federal employees will easily learn to master this new data marketplace 
because it will merely extend their usual and customary competitive bureaucratic 
fights into a new domain. On the other hand, we must be careful and disable some 
marketplace behavior due to the nature of the data traded. Thus, for example, we may 
opt not to allow the advertisement of certain pieces of data (ex: potentially frightening 
data about contaminated former military bases) while permitting the trading in such 
data between, say, the Environment Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of 
Defense (DOD).6 
 
                                                
6  The cleanup of old military bases contaminated by toxins is a good case in point. See: (GAO 2009, 
2009). 
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The proposed new public information marketplace will allow agencies to set prices 
for their data assets based exclusively on external demand (i.e., from other agencies). 
This marketplace will deter fraud as the reputation of the agencies trading in data will 
be at stake. As with the online eBay or Amazon marketplaces, an agency that cheats 
one time will pay dearly for its unruly behavior in countless future transactions. A 
network of external computer servers relying on a computerized version of the 
bureaucratic language (similar to the Dutch RINIS system7) will facilitate and support 
the buy and sell transactions. Micro-transaction engines that already exist 
commercially will empower agencies to execute trillions of buy and sell data 
transactions vis-à-vis each other and execute these transactions in split seconds. 
Multiple information products will be bought and sold in this new marketplace. These 
products can broadly be classified into three categories. First, primary pieces of data 
will be bought and sold (for example: The CIA will be able to purchase data from 
other agencies about suspects and their whereabouts)8. Second agencies will buy and 
sell business intelligence types of information products (for example, EPA can sell a 
new predictive information product that index the probability of a former defense 
bases to suffer from one or more contaminations). Finally, agencies will even be able 
to buy and sell futures contracts in order to sponsor new information technology 
projects. Thus, for example, an agency will be able to pay for the hardware and 
software of a new information system by selling to another agency the rights to 
harvest and analyze the so-called data-exhaust or electronic footprints of citizens who 
will use the new system once it becomes operational. Gradually, carefully, and over 
time, this electronic public information marketplace will be extended to allow private 
sector organizations to join the trading and, later, even citizens will be able to buy and 
sell data vis-à-vis the government.    
 
Important IT trends converge today to create a window of opportunity for the erection 
of the proposed public information marketplace. Today, Federal agencies already 
breathe and think digital data. Digital data itself is the perfect mobile, versatile and 
tradable product as evident by the success of electronic commercial marketplaces such 
as Apple and eBay. It is also much easier today to convert data from one format to 
another. Finally the cost of hardware, software and bandwidth continues to decline. 
Similar commercial marketplaces already exist in the private sector (Ayers 2007 134-
135). 
 
                                                
7  On the Dutch RINIS system and its political origins, see: (Bekkers 2000 ; Homburg 1999 ; Huijboom 
and Hoogwout 2004 ; OECD 2007 ; Snellen 2002 ; Zuurmond 1998). 
8  During the 18 months preceding 9/1//2001, the CIA searched for data about the whereabouts of 
Mohamed Atta. During this very same period, almost a dozen public and private databases held 
information about Atta’s activities. For example, the FBI and DMV had information about four 
incidents in which Atta’s vehicle was stopped in Florida. The INS (today USCIS) database held five 
reports on Atta’s travel from and to the United States, and three about his domestic travels. The FAA’s 
Airman Registration and Aircraft Registry databases contained 14 entries about Atta’s efforts to 
acquire a commercial pilot certificate and to train in a large jet flight simulator in six different air fields 
in three states. Private sector databases also held multiple records on Atta’s apartment leases, cell 
phone purchases, aviation fuel acquisitions, new bank accounts, and transfers of money into these 
accounts. All these pieces of data were utterly useless from the perspective of the agencies owning 
then. Hence, for even the smallest credit, these agencies would have been happy to sell them to the CIA 
(Bright et al. 2001 ; FBI 2007 ; National Commission 2004 ; Inspector General 2002 ) 
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4 CHALLENGES EN-ROUTE TO ERECTING THE NEW 
PUBLIC INFORMATION MARKETPLACE  
Critics are likely to raise powerful challenges and problems en-route to implementing 
successfully the proposed public information marketplace. Legislators who support 
this proposal will need to overcome the incorrect yet powerful "public data must be 
free and it belongs to the citizens" concept that the Obama's administration is 
promoting. Journalists may argue that trading in public data will encourage unruly 
behavior. Worst still, if my proposal is successful, these critics may argue, the public 
will quickly lose its altruistic ideals how public data can be more than just currency 
(Cohen 1989-1990 26). Ethicists may suggest that my too-efficient "just-in-time-data" 
marketplace will propel a new type of big brother government. Bureaucrats from 
politically-weak agencies might be concerned that data-strong ministries (such as the 
Social Security Administration and the IRS) will exploit the new system to become 
even stronger by extracting and manipulating the data assets of weaker agencies. 
Similar concerns were voiced regarding how the information revolution makes 
stronger countries and corporations even stronger at the expense of other weak (and 
weakening) countries and corporations (Braunschvig 1998 ; Premkumar 2003). 
Private sector leaders will become alarmed that the new marketplace might create a 
too-knowledgeable government. Hence, these critics will further argue, this proposed 
information marketplace will alter (for the worst) the delicate balance of (information) 
power among citizens, the third sector, private corporations and the Federal 
government. Legal experts might be concerned that the necessary legislation required 
to support the new marketplace would be delayed in Congress for many years as in 
the case of legislating trade in another contested commodity—human organs (Cohen 
1989-1990 7-8). Economists are likely to ask how initial prices for data assets will be 
set, how pricing algorithms will be developed, and how specific incidents of fraud and 
black marketeering behavior will be dealt with. Finally, software architects might 
argue that a universal computerized bureaucratic language is not feasible because the 
various computer "languages" that Federal agencies "speak" today are too different to 
find a common ground.  
 
Nonetheless, solutions exist to address these challenges. The naïve and altruistic 
www.data.gov model is not as successful as its architects would like the public to 
believe. Over time, politicians, bureaucrats and the general public will discover the 
truth about data.gov and become than more open to listening and accepting alternative 
approaches such as the information marketplace. The decentralized public information 
marketplace will provide adequate privacy protections because the citizen's composite 
virtual data-image will be scattered across scores of agencies rather than stored within 
a single centralized database. Hence, thieves and abusers of virtual data will be 
compelled to leave behind electronic footprints in multiple databases, each located in 
a different agency.  
 
The new public information marketplace will provide incentives for weak agencies to 
discover and harness their hidden data assets and to cooperate with each other in order 
to bring new information products to the Federal data bazaar. In an identical manner, 
during the medieval ages, the politically weak but internally well-networked 
Armenian and Jewish trading communities discovered how to benefit from newly 
created markets and fairs (Braudel 1992 165). We can also use some of the profits of 
the new marketplace to create a "super fund" to reduce the entrance cost for weak 
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agencies into the information marketplace. In addition, legislators can declare certain 
highly valuable data elements that participate in virtually every trade (such as social 
security numbers, passport numbers and vehicle license plate numbers) as shared and 
non tradable data in order to eliminate the built-in advantage of agencies such as the 
Social Security Administration that own these data elements.  
 
New types of Federal units and jobs will be created (ex: departments in charge of 
developing the data pricing algorithms for a given agency) while older units and jobs 
will be eliminated (ex: units that, today, are in charge of negotiating data exchange 
agreements vis-à-vis other agencies). Most certainly, data trading will trigger some 
unruly behavior and uncertainty regarding when and how to acquire data. Still, 
overall, free marketplaces are very efficient in tackling such behavior on their own 
terms. On the legislative and regulatory front, we can adopt the Canadian Voluntary 
Codes (VC) model to start data trading immediately while buying some time for 
legislators (Canada’s Office of Consumer Affairs (OCA) 2007). Finally, over the past 
decade, huge progress was achieved in computerizing the bureaucratic language in 
various domains. Thus, for example, in a previous publication I analyzed the technical 
success of deNovis, a small startup, which converted the immensely complex Federal 
medical claims-payment adjudication rules into an English-like controlled natural 
language.9 The deNovis case study merely illustrates that experts correctly 
predicted—already a decade ago--that embedding translation engines within a smart 
network backbone is a better approach for electronic information sharing than 
attempts to build gigantic "system of systems" databases or campaigns to mandate 
technical standards (Bonometti, Smith, and White 1998 ; Leebaert1998 ‏).  
Interestingly, among other benefits, my proposal will also resolve the problem of 
versioning and re-constructing the point-in-time image of the virtual citizen that the 
Obama's open data approach fails to address.  
 
5 A POLITICAL STRATEGY TO UNLEASH THE NEW 
FEDERAL INFORMATION BAZAAR 
Important public sector reforms sometimes begin with a "crazy idea" such as the one 
proposed here. In the next phase, a group of scholars will increase the credibility and 
validity of this idea by building a common reservoir of metaphors that challenge the 
dominant "Open Data" paradigm. Following this, an unusual and broad coalition of 
supporters can be built to advance the Federal Information Marketplace initiative. As 
demonstrated by the sad history of the failed campaign to advance trading in live and 
cadaver organs, the automatic support of economists and legal experts who habitually 
support every free marketplace initiative will be insufficient to make the new public 
data marketplace initiative successful (Crespi 1994 18-19). Therefore, the political 
coalition that aims to advance the creation of the new Federal data marketplace must 
include politicians, ethicists, journalists, senior bureaucrats, and technical experts. It is 
also possible to divide and rule the opponents' camp. Thus, for example, there will be 
a number of Federal agencies that would be delighted to see the weakening of the 
SSA's data monopoly (via the agency's command of social security numbers). It is 
also possible to first experiment with a prototype of the proposed public information 
marketplace in a "public goods" arena such as sharing data about cleaning the 
                                                
9 Peled, Alon "Traversing Digital Babel" Public Administration Review (forthcoming 2011). 
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environment. The advantage of launching data trading in this type of arena is that, 
conversely from other security domains, the fundamental assumption here is that all 
data ought to be shared. We also must not aspire to solve in advance all types of 
problems. Marketplaces, on their own, are very efficient in creating innovative 
solutions to problems that initially appear insolvable (ex: how to provide price-
discounts for agencies that buy from another agency large bulk amounts of data rather 
than individual pieces of data). Marketplaces are also very effective, when left alone, 
in terms of eliminating black marketeering and fraudulent behavior as demonstrated in 
the case of trading in human organs (Kaserman 2001 ; Schwindt and Vining 1986). 
 
Scholars who studied public information systems concur that the threshold for success 
for the proposed new public information marketplace is very low as Federal agencies 
continue to fail miserably in sharing electronic data (Vann 2005 143-145, 150; White 
2007 5-8,11). In fact, some of the trading mechanisms I proposed above already exist 
today as quasi-legal and informal arrangements within the Federal government (GAO 
2008). Once successful, the marketplace will completely change the "information 
ecology" within the Federal government. Agencies will cease to collect some 
unimportant data and will begin collecting other types of data. In a similar manner, we 
will also see more Federal agencies attempting to create and bring to the marketplace 
new and exciting business intelligence types of information products. Every age in 
history had its unique "royal merchandise" (Braudel 1992 169). Our royal 
merchandise is digital information. The proposed new Federal information 
marketplace where agencies can freely buy and sell data and information products 
from each other is merely the institutional mechanism to unleash the power of the 21st 
century's royal merchandise inside the Federal government.
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